Abstract
Introduction
In 2003, the Bush administration launched the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an innovative development assistance program whose aid allocation mechanism is largely based on a competitive assessment of developing countries' governance performance. In contrast to the donor agencies who, in response to the aid effectiveness debate, implemented new or modified existing aid programs in order to encourage improved governance under existing partnership frameworks, the MCA made good governance an explicit and rigid precondition for the granting of aid to developing countries. The MCA is the first and only bilateral aid agency that has adopted a competitive aid allocation mechanism which explicitly relies on a set of publicly available governance indicators.
With the MCA's increasing significance -the program has since its foundation in 2003 committed nine billion US dollars in grants to 18 developing countries -an extensive debate on its modalities of delivery has ensued. Various aspects, such as the strictly bilateral approach to program implementation without participation in donor harmonization efforts on the ground; its ambiguous relationship to existing US aid agencies such as USAID; and the issue of funding volumes and the absorptive capacities of recipient countries, have been abundantly analyzed and discussed (see for example Sperling and Hart, 2003; Clemens and Radelet, 2003 ).
Yet little attention has been devoted thus far to a key question: Are the perception-based governance indicators used by the MCA conceptually valid, robust, and therefore appropriate for making aid-allocation decisions? In light of the general debate that has emerged on whether perception-based governance indicators satisfactorily measure and distinguish between various dimensions of governance, this question is particularly salient (Langbein and Knack, 2010; Thomas, 2009; Arndt and Oman, 2006) . This paper discusses the validity of the MCA's governance assessment framework. In particular, it explores the merits of the argument often voiced in the literature that the perception-based governance indicators used by the MCA fail to distinguish between various dimensions of governance, especially in the case of developing countries. Using standard statistical techniques to detect latent variables, including Explanatory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis, we find that while the MCA ostensibly measures seven distinct dimensions of governance, only two distinct underlying dimensions -namely, the perceived participatory dimension of governance and the perceived overall quality of governance -can be identified.
Our results suggest that the general doubts that have been voiced concerning these indicators -in particular the singular dimensionality of perception-based governance indicators are less warranted when the indicators are applied exclusively to developing countries.
The following section reviews the current debate on the reliability and validity of perceptionbased governance indicators. Section 3 provides an overview on the MCA's program modalities and its allocation mechanism. Section 4 assesses empirically to what extent the MCA's specific indicator-based method for measuring the quality of governance is reliable, robust and conceptually valid.
Literature Review
While issues such as institutional development, democratic legitimacy, and accountability were of ancillary importance to geo-political and geo-strategic considerations for aid allocation during the Cold War era, in the 1990s good governance emerged as the new sine qua non of development cooperation (for example Dornboos, 2001; Hermes and Lensink, 2001; Chhotray and Hulme, 2009 ). The seminal paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) , which identified a strong relationship between sound policies and economic growth, as well as an abundance of subsequent research provided the empirical grounds for a realignment of aid allocation mechanisms towards explicit or implicit conditionality on good governance (for example Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Arndt and Oman, 2006) . (Kaufmann et al., 1999a; 1999b; 2007a; 2008; Arndt, 2010) . 1 Recent research has discussed several aspects of conceptual and technical limitations of perception-based governance indicators in general, and the World Wide Governance Indicators (WGIs) in particular. Kurtz and Schrank (2007) suggest that the dominant measures of governance, in particular the WGIs, are problematic and suffer from perceptual biases and adverse selection in sampling. Similarly, Thomas (2009) cautions that due to a lack of empirical evidence in support of their construct validity, the WGIs might in effect be an elaborate but unsupported hypothesis. Langbein and Knack (2010) generally question the ability of the WGIs to measure distinct underlying concepts and present empirical evidence of strong content overlap and a tautological construct.
Due to a lack of alternatives, these perception-based indicators are nevertheless used for ranking countries and for subsequent aid allocation (Kaufmann et al., 2002) ; the most prominent example being the MCA. Accordingly, the question is naturally raised as to whether these indicators are suitable for assessing policy performance in developing countries.
The existing literature focuses to large extent on the overall properties of governance indicators (e.g. Kurtz and Schrank, 2007; Langbein and Knack, 2010) , including their intertemporal incomparability, the limitations of cross-country comparability due to large standard errors, and the methods used to aggregate a varying number of source measures (Kaufmann et al. 2007b ). The present paper instead seeks to make a unique contribution by assessing to what extent the application of these indicators to developing countries yields reliable and robust conclusions in terms of dimensionality and measurement reliability. In this way, our analysis, which specifically examines the MCA's aid allocation mechanisms, aims to provide important insights into the dimensionality and validity of governance assessments of Low Income Countries (LICs).
The Millennium Challenge Account

Scale and Scope
At the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference, President G.W. Bush announced the establishment of a new Millennium Challenge Account to provide an additional five billion dollars per year in grants to developing countries. In the words of the President, aid would be disbursed to those countries that govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom.
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Aside from the amount of aid promised, the most notable aspect of the MCA program is its competitive allocation process, which uses predefined and transparent governance measures to determine country eligibility. This means that the MCA's mechanism to identify eligible countries is clearly segregated from US foreign policy objectives; an aspect that has received considerable attention (Radelet, 2002a; 2002b; OECD, 2003) . 3 Furthermore, the program displays a commitment to strengthening recipient ownership and accountability by assigning developing countries the lead in program development and implementation. This has been perceived as a progress towards delivering on the commitments to provide more effective aid made by the international donor community at Source : Tarnoff, 2009 and The White House, (2010) .
Monterrey
Although the original commitment of an additional five billion US dollars per year has never been met, the scale of MCA funds is significant in both absolute and relative terms (Table 1) . In order to realize the MCA's transformational potential and encourage recipient countries to implement projects and programs critical to their economic and social development, the MCA intended to place its assistance among the top aid donors in eligible countries (Nowels, 2006) .
Over the last five years the financial value of compact programs has constantly increased. (Radelet, 2002b) . In total, seven of the 17 MCA policy measures are governance indicators. Perception-based composite governance indicator measuring the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
World Bank Institute
Business Start-Up Index indicator ranging from 0 to 1 calculated from the un-weighted average of the two index sub-indicators 'number of days to start a business' and 'cost of starting a business' as percentage of GNI per capita. Another factor affecting the MCA's allocation scheme is public opinion in the US (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009 ). With civil society, influential NGOs and media taking a much more critical stance towards public aid monies than in Europe, the new aid program has been premised on a tightly supervised and deductive framework to ensure domestic accountability and the regular provision of evidence on the proper use of funds to the public.
Under the institutional economic theory that informs the aid programs of the World Bank and other leading development agencies, governance is understood as a set of institutional rules for the coordination of social, political, and economic activities, rules that determine and/or shape a country's ability to develop and generate economic growth (Benz et al., 2007 ). Yet while institutional economics are per se positivistic, perception-based governance indicators composed of third-party expert assessments and expert polls do not represent a form of de jure or de facto assessment, but instead draw on a universalistic, normative governance concept whose determinates are explicitly invariant across political, cultural, and sociological contexts, i.e. across countries as well as over time (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009 ).
While the MCA justifies the use of governance indicators by appealing to the aforementioned research that suggests there is a positive relationship between good policies and growth on the one hand and the effectiveness of aid on the other, the MCA does not provide any empirical or analytical evidence that the seven governance indicators reflect or relate to this very abstract and broad concept of governance. As the reliability of the seven governance indicators depends on their validity and ability to discriminate effectively among the MCA's seven dimensions of governance, the lack of an explicit conceptual foundation seems particularly problematic. This is all the more true in light of recent research that has raised considerable concerns about the reliability of perception-based governance indicators, particularly the WGIs.
Dimensionality of MCA's Governance Concept
To analyze whether the governance indicators used by the MCA depict one or perhaps several dimensions of governance, we use Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA) to identify dominant underlying, unobservable variables. Based on these results, a causal model is set up and tested by means of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The time frame for the analysis is 
Preliminaries
A certain lack of clarity in the MCA's governance concept is already apparent in the arbitrary and partially redundant classification framework. Kaufmann et al. (2007a) Simple bivariate correlations calculated from a sample covering nine years and a minimum of 185 countries (all countries sample) confirms this pattern (Table 4) . Two principle interdependent groups of variables with an extremely high bivariate correlation (above 90 per cent) can be distinguished:
 The first group includes the WGI CC, WGI GE, WGI RL, and WGI RQ,  the second group comprises the two FH indicators and the WGI VA.
The same pattern can be found in the bivariate correlation matrix calculated from LICs (LIC sample), albeit with a significantly lower degree of correlation. 
Explanatory Factor Analysis
A method frequently used to test for construct validity and to control for underlying or unobservable source variables (that is abstract concepts) is Explanatory Factor Analysis, or EFA. This analytical method is based on the assumption that a set of observable variables is loaded by a number of underlying factors of which some are common and some are unique (Kim and Mueller, 1990; 1994) . Hence, EFA provides an indication of the extent to which the variance of the seven indicators can be explained by separate, distinguishable dimensions (unique factors), and the extent to which variance is driven by a structure of common, indistinguishable dimensions (common factors). It is assumed that (i) common factors are orthogonal, (ii) that unique factors are uncorrelated with each other, and (iii) that common factors are uncorrelated with the unique factors.
Starting with the sample covering all countries, our calculations identify one dominant factor that explains 80 per cent of the existing variance. The corresponding eigenvalue of this factor is 5.6, compared to 0.8 for the second (Table 5) . The criteria applied to determine how many common factors to retain are taken from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . Kaiser recommends dropping factors with an eigenvalue smaller than one. Jolliffe (2002) suggests a cutoff of 0.7, as simulation studies find that Kaiser's criterion might in the presence of sampling errors lead to a situation in which the population eigenvalue is significantly higher than the sampling eigenvalue. As both criteria yield the same result, a one-factor model is considered appropriate in the all-country sample. This finding is in line with previous studies, e.g. Langbein and Knack (2010) , who also emphasize that the WGI indicators in fact all measure the same basic concept. As MCA uses the governance indicators to identify good performers among the group of developing countries for purposes of aid allocation, the subsequent empirical analysis focuses on LICs. It yields a surprisingly clear-cut result: The assumption of a one-factor model has to be put in doubt. The explained variance of the first factor drops to 60 per cent and the eigenvalue of the second factor rises to 1.23 (Table 6 ). The second common factor explains 16 per cent of total variance. Even though the LIC sample might contain considerable more noise, approximately 80 per cent of the total sample variance is explained by these two factors. Accordingly, both the Kaiser and Jolliffe criterion recommend sticking to a two-factor solution. The EFA results do not significantly change when factors are determined for each year or for sub-periods between 1998 and 2007 (see Appendix IV and V). Furthermore, they are robust with respect to the factor extraction method used. (ii) The second is mainly loaded by FH PRI, FH CLI, and WGI VA, reflecting the extent to which civil society and the citizenry is perceived to be in the position to control and monitor government institutions. This can be considered as the participatory dimension of governance.
These findings partly contradict the conclusions of Langbein and Knack (2010) who, based on a similar statistical analysis, comprising developed and developing countries, suggest that the WGIs generally fail to distinguish between different dimensions of governance and are a function of only one latent variable or underlying factor. The inclusion of developed countries with high across-the-board rankings probably results in a lower factor complexity, which is corroborated by the analysis covering the full sample. However, in case of the aid allocation, the concentration on a model tailored for LIC countries seems appropriate. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The EFA model with two common factors measuring the perceived quality and efficiency of government institutions and the perceived participatory dimension of governance provides well-interpretable and useful results. However, as EFA rests on several rigid assumptions (for example that all observed variables (indicators) are directly affected by all common factors and that common factors are uncorrelated) results should be subjected to further scrutiny, such as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The CFA model structure of the observed and unobserved factors is identical to the one derived by EFA (two common factor model).
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Yet in contrast to EFA, which aims to determine the number of latent variables -that is the number of unobservable governance dimensions based on a set of assumptions about the latent variables' relation to the observables -CFA allows for different identified model specifications to be compared and tested, such as the number of common factors, correlated common factors, correlated errors, and different degrees of factor complexity.
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The standard CFA estimation technique of Maximum Likelihood estimation gives standard errors for factor loadings and several fit criteria, such as the Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI).
The loading structure of the best fitting CFA LIC model is shown in Figure 2 . All factor loadings are significant at the one-per cent level. Confidence intervals for the point estimates are rather small (see Appendix VI). RMSR (0.02), CFI (0.95), and TLI (0.93) indicate an overall very good fit of the specification (Hair et al., 2006) . Other loading specifications, in particular those with a single common factor, correlated errors, and a lower or higher factor complexity, had to be rejected due to inadequate fit or insignificant loading patterns. While the strong CFA loading pattern confirms the two common factors result for LICs derived from EFA, it detects a significant positive correlation between the two unobservables. Accordingly, the perceived overall quality and efficiency of government institutions and the perceived participatory dimension of government have to be considered as discrete but related concepts that in the case of the MCA are measured through several similar proxies.
To verify that the findings, particularly the level of factor complexity, are specific to the group of LICs, CFA estimations are replicated for the non-LIC, i.e. the Middle and High Income Countries sample. Two non-LIC sample CFA estimation specifications qualify for consideration: A simple one common factor model (Appendix VII) yields statistically significant loadings in a meaningful range from 0.62 to 0.97. However, the overall fit of the model is weak with an RMSR of 0.15. The loading structure of the second CFA non-LIC specification (Figure 3 ) is comparable to the LIC-sample two common factor model (Figure 2) . While loadings show similar levels of significance but superior overall fit compared to the non-LIC one common factor model, the high positive correlation (0.74) between the two principal factors suggests, that the two underlying concepts could well be indiscrete (Appendix VIII).
Considerations on Construct Validity
While EFA and CFA advises on the dimensionality of the seven considered perception-based indicators, these methods do not allow to draw conclusions on the extent to which the indicators are based on a conceptually viable construct, i.e. to what extent aggregated perceptions serve as valid proxies for abstract dimensions of governance. As a direct verification of measurement validity of MCA's perception-based indicators is not possible due to the inherently unobservable characteristics of the construct of governance, an ancillary verification strategy such as assessing how the perception-based indicators relate to coextensive measures derived from objective, de jure and/or de facto assessment criteria can be applied.
As devising such objective measures for a large country sample is a complex and encyclopedic undertaking as it implies a careful appraisal of the legislative regulatory framework (de jure) and/or the identification and assessment of criteria for its implementation (de facto), only few data sources with satisfying country and time coverage are available.
A recognized provider of indicators based on de jure and de facto assessment is due to its unambiguous criteria, its considerable country coverage and its good methodological documentation the Global Integrity Initiative (GII).
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The GII sub-indicator Public Access to Information, for example, records whether citizens are entitled to access basic government records by law, whether citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied (both de jure); but also maps whether in practice citizens actually receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period and at reasonable cost (de facto).
To assess construct validity of abstract constructs, Thomas (2010) suggests considering two criteria: Convergent and discriminant validity. While the former is concerned with the extent to which the measure is correlated with other measures to which in theory it should relate, the latter reflects the extent to which the measure is uncorrelated with measures or variables to which in theory it should not relate.
Significant convergent validity can be detected when calculating Spearman rank coefficients for the Middle-and High Income country sample (Table 7) . It shows that congruence or significant overlap in measurement content (bold correlation coefficients) is indeed associated with a higher degree of correlation (differently grey shaded fields according to degree of correlation). A particularly high correlation can be detected between indicators purporting to measure the accountability and participatory dimensions of governance, i.e. between WGI VA, FH CLI, FH PRI and GII Civil Society, Public Information and Media, GII Elections, and GII Government Accountability, respectively. The considerable noise, i.e. high correlation among indicators where no explicit overlap in measurement content can be expected, in turn indicates that discriminant validity of WGI and FH perception-based indicators is however rather limited.
Interestingly, the Spearman rank correlation pattern cannot be reproduced when calculating MCA and GII indicator rank coefficients for the LIC sample (Table 8) 
Conclusion
Whereas past research has focused on the conceptual characteristics of perception-based governance indicators in general, this paper provides a specific analysis of the MCA's application of governance indicators for aid allocation. Our research is of special interest to policy makers who rely on these indicators when making aid-allocation decisions.
Our analysis suggests that the general concerns that have been raised in numerous papers with regard to the singular dimensionality of perception-based governance indicators such as the WGIs appear less problematic insofar as the assessment of developing countries is concerned.
The single dimensionality identified for the WGIs by Langbein and Knack (2010) is apparently to large extent caused by the heteroscedastic properties of the all-country sample.
When excluding more developed countries who generally perform well across the board and produce little sample variance, a more nuanced picture emerges. Looking exclusively at the MCA's use of the WGIs to assess developing and least developed countries, a higher degree of common factorial causation is found.
However, our research shows that the meaningful use of quantitative perception-based governance indicators for the allocation of ODA to developing countries is a delicate and nontrivial undertaking. This is the case not only because of the difficulties in ranking point estimates in the presence of large measurement errors and relative peer-related, time-variant scaling -a topic that has been frequently discussed -but also, and more crucially, because of persisting uncertainties regarding measurement reliability and the conceptual validity of the selected measures. The seven indicators appear to have been selected in a somewhat arbitrary manner, in the absence of an effort to scrutinize their measurement validity and dimensionality. The result is a distorted and only ostensibly transparent allocation mechanism.
Although the MCA uses seven indicators that purportedly measure different dimensions of governance, only two underlying governance concepts can be clearly identified -namely, the perceived participatory dimension of governance, and the perceived overall quality of governance. While the participatory dimension focuses on the citizenry's ability to actively participate in political will-formation and to hold public agents accountable, the overall quality of governance is understood as construct for the extent to which the sphere of legislative, executive, and judiciary is able to provide an efficient, predictable and rule-based governance framework.
To eliminate the most fundamental dimensionality-related shortcomings, the indicators could be merged in accordance with the identified dimensional pattern using weighted factor scores or redundant indicators could be dropped. This would substantially reduce overrepresentation of congruent perception-based indicators in the MCA's ex-ante performance assessment although it could be perceived as negatively effecting transparency of MCA's selection process of eligible countries.
At the same time however, a basic analysis of Spearman rank coefficients provides some indications that in the case of LICs, the MCA's perception-based indicators' convergent and discriminant validity might be diluted. Two explanations seem plausible; perception of LICs' governance performance might be strongly biased and / or perception of the quality of governance in LICs is particularly persistent.
As potentially weak construct validity would present a serious defect and a reason for questioning the use of perception-based governance indicators in aid allocation decisions, further and more comprehensive research on this topic is required. To encourage committed non-qualifying countries to improve their overall governance and service delivery performance the MCA also provides funding under so-called 'Threshold Programs'. Threshold Programs aim to help countries undertake institutional and policy reforms in areas where they have failed to meet MCA's performance criteria. According to current legislation, not more than 10 percent of overall MCA appropriations may be provided to Threshold Countries (Nowels, 2006 This refers to the list of indicators for fiscal year 2009. Indicators have been repeatedly revised and amended (MCA, 2004; 2006; 2008; . 10 The board is however left with substantial discretion in selecting eligible countries: 'A review of the history of the MCA selections suggests that the Board is guided by, but not entirely bound to, the outcome of the performance indicator review process; board members can apply discretion in their selection. Performance trends, missing or old date, and recent policy actions might come into play during selection deliberations.' Further: 'The Board also examines whether a country performs substantially below average on any single indicator and whether their selection was supported by supplemental information' (Tarnoff, 2009). 11 It is important to note that the indicators used here measure perceived governance outcomes and do not compare institutions which would require a deeper de jure analysis. 12 Based on expert appraisals, a weighted scale ranging from 1 to 7 is computed for each of the two indicators. According to Freedom House, the sources used for computing the scores are selected and evaluated by a number of analysts and consultants who use an array of information, including news reports and information from NGOs, to review the scorings and to check for consistency. A more detailed description of the methodology, the experts' questionnaire and the aggregation process can be obtained from http://www.freedomhouse.org. 13 The WGI project includes the computation of six indicators, five of which are used for the MCA selection process. 14 All definitions provided in parenthesis are taken from Kaufmann et al., 2007. 15 The WGIs are composed from 310 individual underlying data sources that are assigned to one of the dimensions and are then aggregated using an unobserved component model that attributes weights to individual variables according to their estimated precision. For a more detailed description of construction and aggregation and the data sources, see Kaufmann et al., 2004; 2005. 16 The latter hypothesis can be specifically validated by testing the results of bivariate OLS regression for each indicator on GNI/capita. The White-test indicates that the null hypothesis of a constant variance of OLS residuals can be rejected at the 10 percent level in all cases, except for WGI RQ. The Preusch-Pagan test clearly rejects the homoscedasticity hypothesis in five of the seven cases. 17 Maximum Likelihood and iterated principal factors yield very similar results with only minor deviations. For an overview on methods of factor extraction see Kim and Mueller (1994) . 18 For EFA and CFA the sample and sub-samples are normalized such that average is zero and standard deviation is 1 in each year. 19 λ ik describes the loading of the observed variable j by the common (unobservable) factor k. δ j describes the loading of the unique factor on the observable variable j. In the case of EFA, squared loadings, for both common and unique factors, can be interpreted as the share in the observable's variance, as the variables are normalized such that their variance is 1. For the applied method of rotation see Appendix III. 20 An explanatory note on the difference between the EFA and CFA method is provided in Appendix II. 21 The CFA estimation is based on the STATA® Confa algorithm devised by Kolenikov (2009) . Results for best fit CFA specifications can be found in appendix IV (LIC country sample). 22 Results are available from the authors upon request. 23 The GII publishes six government performance indicators, aggregated from 23 sub-indicators (see Table 7 and 8) which in turn are computed from quantitative assessments of palpable de jure and de facto criteria. GII indicators have been published for 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 . Country coverage varies by year. For GII a comprehensive description of the methodology please the reader is referred to the GII web site http://www.globalintegrity.org/information/ downloads. The relationship between the adjusted correlation matrix R and the factor loading matrix is not unique because (1) a specific adjusted correlation matrix can be reproduced by models with different numbers of factors and (2) a specific adjusted correlation matrix can be generated by a specific number of factors but different factor loading patterns.
Notes
For the extraction of loadings the postulate of parsimonious factorial causation (assuming that observables are loaded by a minimum number of factors) and the postulate of simplicity (the model with the smallest factor complexity) have to be made.
Solving the determinant form of the eigenequation and determine eigenvalues:
Where is the adjusted correlation matrix. 
